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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the connection between the rise of new types of online uncivil 
discourses on the one hand and the success of populism on the other. We argue that 
while discussions on the rise of populist politics have mainly centred on 
institutionalised politics and politicians only limited attention has been paid to how the 
success of the former and the latter was propelled by developments outside of the 
realm of political practice narrowly conceived. Our interest is therefore in the rise of 
uncivil society, in particular on the web, and in its ‘borderline discourse’ at the verge 
of civil and uncivil ideas, ideologies and views. Those discourses – which we 
showcase on the example of Austria and Sweden – have been using especially the 
civil-to-uncivil shifts in the discursive representations of society and politics. These 
have progressively ‘normalised’ the anti-pluralist views across many European public 
spheres on a par with nativist and exclusionary views now widely propagated by 
right-wing populist politics in Europe and beyond. They have also been at the core of 
the now widespread ‘post-truth politics’ where imagined exclusionary ideologies and 
emotions abide, norms of civility are constantly tested, and facts and reality are 
treated as, at best, secondary.     
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the connection between the rise of new types of online uncivil 
discourses on the one hand and the political and electoral success of populism on 
the other. We argue that while discussions on the rise of populist politics have mainly 
centred on organized political parties and groups (especially in the context of right-
wing populism in Europe and beyond; see e.g. Wodak 2015), only some limited 
attention has been paid to how the success of the latter was fuelled by developments 
outside of the realm of politics and political practice narrowly conceived (Mazzoleni 
2008).  
 
Our special interest is therefore in the rise of uncivil society, in particular on the web, 
and in its ‘borderline discourse’ at the verge of civil and uncivil ideas, ideologies and 
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views. However, we are not interested in the still widespread and indeed 
continuously expanding loci where radical-political and hence ‘uncivil’ views are 
nested and spread (as is the case with e.g. Nazi groups etc., cf. Mammone, Godin 
and Jenkins 2012; Hainsworth 2016; Rydgren 2017). We look instead at discourses 
which under the guise of civility largely express uncivil views that are in stark contrast 
to liberal-democratic order. These discourses, we claim, started to emerge in recent 
years (especially from ca. the end of the first decade of 2000s onwards) mainly in the 
countries that witnessed either the rapid rise or further institutionalisation of right-
wing populist politics (of these we focus below specifically on Austria and Sweden). 
There, we argue, the emergence of online as well as, later on, social media has 
fostered the rise of various agorae of exchange of views which often escape the 
traditional norms of political expression by progressively ‘testing’ as well as 
‘stretching’ norms of publically-acceptable language on inclusive society and politics.  
 
As we argue, the emergence of such agorae as new ‘sites of production and 
reception of public discourse’ (van Dijk 1991) are particularly vital for the wider recent 
success of populist politics in Europe and beyond. There, as has been widely 
documented, the change of widely-accepted norms of debating politics and society 
has been central. It has taken place and resulted in not only the transformation of 
acceptable language on social and political matters (e.g. widespread public 
expression of forceful anti-immigrant and nationalist views) but also fuelled the wider 
undermining of key norms and values of liberal societies including issues of gender, 
ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and equality. It also propelled the rebirth of 
nativism and nationalism (cf. e.g. Trump’s “America First”, but also earlier populist 
slogans such as e.g. the “Austria First” in the 1990s; Matouschek, Wodak and 
Januschek 1995; Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2009; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 
2003; Wodak and Richardson 2009) which re-focussed political sympathies from 
groups favouring liberal and open society to those proposing exclusionary 
isolationism, protectionism and foregrounding the rights of ‘our people’ (see Wodak 
2017 in this Special Issue).     
 
2. Populism and the Online Uncivil Society  
 
We perceive “uncivil society” (see below for a detailed definition) as a populist 
phenomenon par excellence for several reasons. First, it is probably one fulfilment of 
a conception of populism which, according to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), is 
driven on a peculiar duality of, on the one hand, undermining the key values and 
principles of liberal democracy while, on the other, essentially willing to act within its 
standard processes and structures. Within this context, (online) uncivil society which 
we highlight below appears to be an essence of populism i.e. it is not (anymore) a set 
of political processes and phenomena happening especially within the polarised loci 
of ‘politics’ on the one hand, and ‘people’, or its representatives that is the civil 
society, on the other. On the contrary, the uncivil society essentially emphasises that 
populism is a continuum of practices which locate between ‘politics’ and the ‘people’ 
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and which essentially provide a strategic promulgation of views characteristic for both 
the former and the latter.  
 
Indeed, the duality above as well as the transient as well as continuous nature of 
uncivil populist practices is the key reason why we endorse here the famous 
conception of ‘uncivil society’ as proposed by Carlo Ruzza (2009) in his seminal 
study on uncivil society movements and their relation to institutionalised right-wing 
politics in contemporary Italy. Ruzza (2009, 88) saw uncivil society as primarily 
“groups which have a self-professed antidemocratic and exclusionary political 
identity” nd such that (a) act against – rather than for the benefit of –liberal-
democratic principles of an open society and (b) are, even if unofficially, often closely 
linked to political parties and groups rather being voluntary bottom-up organizations 
and, effectively, a ‘voice’ of the civil society. 
 
Ruzza also pointed to uncivil society as, essentially, driven only by the pretence of 
representing and being close to the ‘people’ and perhaps largely resembling – 
especially in terms of their discourse – of voices of the ‘civil society’. But at the same 
time he emphasised that uncivil society is first and foremost characterised by some 
very close ties to (in particular populist and radical) institutionalised politics whose 
views it principally propagates and represents. Ruzza (2009, 91) therefore made it 
clear that the “non-modern or anti-modern conception of life” held by uncivil society 
aligns closely with different right-wing ideologies, and that the uncivil society is 
therefore highly dangerous to contemporary European societies in which right-wing 
populism has spread as a ‘contagion’ in recent years (Rydgren 2005; Rydgren and 
van der Meiden 2016).  
 
Following the above, we approach the uncivil society platforms showcased below as 
a good indication that populism is now increasingly taking place – or is essentially 
constructed and projected – not only within the institutionalised politics but also in the 
spheres attached to it yet located between political realm as such or its social base. 
This shows inasmuch some classic approaches which saw populism as, e.g., a type 
of opportunity for democratic empowerment (see, inter alia, Goodwyn 1976; Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2005) need to be taken into consideration with care 
nowadays i.e. when not only the actual ‘loci’ of populist practices (i.e. institutionalised 
politics and/or beyond) are central, but also when the actual character of practices 
and discourse come to the fore. Hence, we claim, there now exists a growing need to 
re-focus both theoretical and analytical attention in populism research to what used 
to be defined as the key negative effects of populism on liberal democracy (Mudde 
and Kaltwasser 2017, 83) and what now seems to be at the core of political and 
discursive strategies of populism within and beyond politics. In this context, the 
reshaping of majority-minority relations appears central – as is evidenced especially 
in the accelerating discourses and practices of othering (‘us’ vs. ‘them’), anti-
immigration politics (‘natives’/’our people’ vs. ‘foreigners/immigrants/refugees’), etc. It 
also often becomes reality that ‘populism can use the notion and praxis of majority 
 4 
rule to circumvent minority rights’ (ibid.). This, in turn, points to the fact that “populists 
are always antipluralist” (Müller 2016, 3, orig. emphasis) and that, whether political or 
not, populist discourses are currently driven by both their ‘exclusionary agendas’ and 
the constant ‘transgressing of norms and taboos’ (Wodak 2015, 1ff). This, to be sure, 
undermines the core idea of liberal democracy which “requires pluralism and the 
recognition that we need to find fair terms of living together as free, equal, but also 
irreducibly diverse citizens” (Müller 2016, 3). 
 
3. Uncivil, ‘Borderline’ Discourses and Practices 
 
Studies on un/incivility and communication of political views have focussed 
extensively on bottom-up incivility i.e. the use of, especially, mobile technologies – 
but also increasingly online and social media – to enable expression of uncivil up to 
radical opinions and views among the public and the wider citizenry (see e.g. 
Groschek and Cutino 2016). Within this body of research, some scholars have clearly 
seen more opportunities than dangers of the wider mediatisation of society for the 
rise of civic norms (see esp. Papacharissi 2004), with only few studies alarming that 
the affordances of online mediation can effectively contribute) to the social-wide 
spread of uncivility and non-liberal norms (Yardi and Boyd 2010). The latter has 
been, in fact, also a predominant view in several studies which looked at un/incivility 
in a top-down way and examined it in the use of social and online media in politics, 
online platforms and online presence of mass media. This trend has highlighted the 
spread of uncivil ideas and views within and across the public spheres and examined 
the related – chiefly negative – dynamics of norms of political communication and 
political expression (see esp. Harcourt 2012; Theocharis et al 2016; Sobieraj and 
Berry 2011; Santana 2014) often as part of wider trend of looking on the impact of 
uncivil politics on electoral choices and dynamics (Brooks and Geer 2007).     
 
While our focus wishes to locate in between the aforementioned bottom-up and top-
down approaches it also aims to tackle the actual discursive construction of the 
populist borderline between civil (i.e. pro-democratic) and in/uncivil (i.e. anti-pluralist 
and anti-democratic) ideas and ideologies. Our work therefore dovetails with debates 
and linguistic struggles regarding the borderline between ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’, where, 
on the one hand, arenas clearly dominated by the expressions of civil views typical 
for the ‘mainstream society’ (e.g. large ‘quality’ newspapers, public service 
broadcasting, mainstream politics etc.) dominate one side of the spectrum. On the 
other hand, there are also arenas that appear to be emblematic sites of ‘uncivility’, 
such as e.g. webpages of right-wing extremists.  
 
What appears to be located in-between – or at the borderline of – those two, 
polarised ends of the spectrum of the public sphere are the alternative and in 
particular right-wing populist arenas. These include e.g. webpages and online 
discussion platforms such as those we showcase and briefly analyse (see below). 
However, we show that these platforms effectively express or give voice to anti-
 5 
pluralist, exclusionary and ‘unacceptable’ discourses (in most cases in relation to 
immigration, diversity, and multiculturalism), yet do so under the guise of – or at least 
while being introduced by – the seemingly politically-correct or acceptable discourse. 
They hence are deemed here as, in their end-effect, uncivil and as discursively 
constructing and propagating the uncivil ideas and norms only under the guise of a 
certain degree of civility. They do so while profiting from their placement in-between 
‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ views and their self-proclaimed role as interlocutors of the accepted 
sites of debating political views (e.g. in mainstream media and politics, see Figure 1) 
through which they gain at least some legitimacy. They also, thereby, disseminate 
views of the institutionalised right-wing (populist) politics that the uncivil society is in 
the majority of cases attached to (see above). 
 
The ‘alternative’ uncivil society sites often contest and challenge many norms of the 
public sphere including e.g. those of ‘political correctness’ (despite its also obvious 
ideological baggage; cf. Wilson 1995) and thereby contribute to the overall shift or, in 
fact, the profound change of norms and patterns of expression which, in turn, fuel 
developments such as the recent rise of ‘post-truth politics’ and populism (see, inter 
alia, Harsin 2015, Krugman 2011, see also Wodak 2017 and Lakoff 2017 in this 
Special Issue). They also repeatedly attempt to redefine the borders of civil language 
as such and thus constitute a case of the so-called ‘normalisation to the right’ 
(Wodak 2015a, 2015b; Link 2014) whereby the mainly uncivil – rather than civil – 
views become a ‘norm’ in contemporary societies and where the meaning of key 
social concepts as (e.g. ‘immigration’) receives new sets of connotations esp. in the 
form favoured by right-wing populist views, which, though previously largely 
unacceptable, now become an acceptable norm (see Wodak 2015b; see also 
Krzyżanowski 2013a, 2016). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Borderline populist discourses between ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ public spaces. 
 
However, just like populism cannot be considered outside its relationships to 
traditional/mainstream politics or the wider structures of (liberal) democracy, such is 
also the case with uncivil (online) discourses which, effectively, cannot be conceived 
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of outside of their relationship to the mainstream media (which the uncivil society also 
often calls the ‘old’ media). Paradoxically, through its frequent attempts to minimise 
the risks and ignore the socio-political and politico-economic dangers of right-wing 
populism and extremism, those are the mainstream media that have fuelled the 
development of inter-spaces in the public spheres that eventually came to be 
occupied by uncivil online platforms now competitive to the traditional media 
organisations. Initially viewed as ‘alternative public spheres on the web’ (Dahlgren 
2005) many of the online platforms have, however, proved to have negative rather 
than positive implications to the wider public spheres and their civil and democratic 
character (Alvares and Dahlgren 2016). In a structural sense, online technologies 
also enabled right-wing populists – as we show, whether politically-institutionalised or 
not – to effectively circumvent traditional media channels and form new 
communicative spaces where civic norms are reinterpreted, tested and, effectively, 
undermined. This, to be sure, has taken place quite similarly to the ways in which 
online communication has been efficiently used by right-wing populist politics whose 
online self-mediation has been used widely to spread uncivil populist ideologies and 
views, indeed often under the guise of closeness to citizens as well as of interactivity 
and familiarity (Calhoun 2016; Krzyżanowski 2013a, 2018a, 2018b; Forchtner, 
Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2013; see also Dahlgren and Alvares 2013).  
 
4. Uncivil Society on the Web: (Brief) Examples from Austria and Sweden 
 
Below, we briefly showcase a set of discursive dynamics and strategies traditionally 
deployed in online uncivil society discourse. Our aim here is to exemplify that, while 
taking place in different socio-political and national contexts – in our case Austria and 
Sweden – uncivil society discourses are characterised by largely similar features 
which, as such, can also be frequently recontextualised between various countries 
and platforms.  
 
Our analysis looks specifically at two online uncivil society platforms: Austrian 
platform unzensuriert.at (in English: uncensored, see https://www.unzensuriert.at) 
and Swedish Avpixlat (in English: pictured/depicted, see http://avpixlat.info). Both 
platforms – established in 2009 and 2011 respectively – share their political 
ontologies inasmuch they both have been in various ways developed and supported 
by current/former activists and functionaries of the key parliamentarian right-wing 
populist parties (RWPs): the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) in 
Austria, and Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) in Sweden.  
 
The platforms, both very popular and widely used, claim to be focussed on informing 
citizens and share objective information and opinion as part of allegedly increasing 
pluralism in the media. However, in fact, with their key aim is in opposing mainstream 
political and mass media outlets which they traditionally link to ‘old’ politics (contrary 
to right-wing populism which they quite obviously see as a ‘new’). Their key 
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foci/topics are, accordingly, issues of immigration and asylum – in most cases as part 
of critique of political establishment except for the RWPs – as well as ideological 
criticism of the wider national and international (esp. EU) politics and, in particular, 
socio-economic policies (incl. welfare, housing, labour, etc.).      
 
We look below on two selected posts in German and Swedish which were published 
on the analysed platforms during the current ‘Refugee Crisis’1 in progress from ca. 
2014 until the present and culminating in ca. 2015-16 (see Triandafyllidou, 
Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2018). We take two items published in different phases of 
the ‘crisis’ – one from its beginnings in early 2014 (Austria, 367 words incl. headline) 
and one from its culminating phase in late 2015 (Sweden, 246 words incl. headline) – 
and concerning the (alleged) violence among refugees/asylum seekers who are 
mainly constructed as Muslim (and non-Christian).  
 
Our analytical aim is in showing that despite being published on different platforms 
and in different national contexts various items reveal an array of similarities thus 
pointing to processes of “recontextualisation” (Bernstein 1990; Krzyżanowski 2016) 
of, as far as these can be established, some common features of online uncivil 
society rhetoric. Our brief analysis relies mainly on categories of critical discourse 
studies of right-wing populism and anti-immigration rhetoric (Krzyżanowski 2012, 
2013a; Wodak and Pelinka 2002; Wodak 2015). In the course of our search for the 
‘borderline discourse’ dynamics highlighted above, we aim to exemplify how the 
overall macro-level ‘civil’ framing of the news items – from the point of view of, e.g., 
security, concerns for public safety and the workings of public institutions – in fact 
allows the authors of the news items to eventually convey many ‘uncivil’ meanings. 
We hence point to a certain civil-to-uncivil strategic ‘frame shift’ (Goffman 1974), 
which, often without any specific ‘discourse markers’ (Schiffrin 1982), moves towards 
and thereby normalises as quasi-civil the de facto uncivil expressions incl. standard 
features of discriminatory, xenophobic and Islamophobic rhetoric2.  
 
The Austrian unzensuriert.at post (see Figure 2) comes from 02 April 2014 and 
concerns an alleged attack in which a catholic church – or as it is later claimed 
several churches - in Austria was/were vandalised by a Muslim asylum-seeker. The 
overall (civil) framing for the news item is provided by the visuals posted next to the 
main text and presenting an Austrian police car thus implying that the issues of public 
																																																						
1 Despite its by now widespread presence in public and academic discourse, the notion of ‘Refugee 
Crisis’ is approached critically in this article. It is viewed as an ideologically charged notion developed 
in media & political discourse, also as a recontextualisation of earlier (negativised) descriptions of 
large-scale developments related to immigration and asylum-seeking (e.g. in the context of wars in 
former Yugoslavia in early 1990s, etc.). The notion is therefore used in parentheses throughout the 
paper. 
2 In a wider sense, the discursive strategy we point to here could well be considered a case of what 
Engel and Wodak (2013) called ‘calculated ambivalence’. However, while our main interest here is in 
the actual process of uncivil-to-civil shifting, including with use of visual-to-linguistic shifts, we are also 
unable to show the strategic end-effect of establishing conceptual ambivalence in the analysed 
discourse due to limitations of space.  
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safety and institutions. However, it is already in the subtitle of the main image reading 
‘Police catches church-vandal’ (Polizei fasst Kirchenschänder) where the gradual 
shift towards the uncivil frame occurs, initially by means of refocussing the attention 
from public force (police) to the individualised ‘vandal’. In a similar vein, the list of 
keywords placed immediately under the main heading (incl. Christianity, Asylum-
Seeker, Ibrahim A., Ghana, Asylum, Church, etc.) suggests that this text should not 
be perceived as an isolated item but that it links very closely to wider Austrian 
discourses esp. on immigration, religious differences etc3.  
 
 
  
Figure 2: Unzensuriert.at Post of 02/04/20144  
 
As soon as one begins the reading of the main text of the item, it also becomes clear 
that the uncivil frame is the one that is, in fact, dominating throughout. We learn first 
about an ‘asylum seeker’ (Asylwerber) who later on, in the course of nominalisation 
chains, is further specified as ‘Ghanian’ (Ghanaer) and eventually proper-named as 
‘Ibrahim A.’ and then are provided with explanation of his alleged actions. As it is 
stated: ‘He claimed that Allah gave him the task’ (Er meinte, Allah hätte ihn 
beauftragt) with thus the introduction of the (here still only implied) Islam-related 
motives for the violence.  
 
The highlighting of religious difference – also marked by violent/radical and active 
representative of Islam and passive/affected symbols of Christianity – are vital in 
																																																						
3 As such, this text also links well with the then ongoing discourse about asylum seekers in Austria. 
Following the famous 2013 ‘Votivkirchen’ protests (see, inter alia, 
http://wien.orf.at/news/stories/2572156) – whereby several asylum seekers protested against violation 
and denial of their rights by seeking shelter and undertaking subsequent hunger strikes incl. in the 
central-Viennese Votive-Church – a discourse about symbolic ‘taking over’ of churches by the 
allegedly Muslim asylum seekers eventually erupted and become widespread in Austrian right-wing 
populist politics and uncivil society discourse.  
4 See: https://www.unzensuriert.at/content/0015140-Wieder-Anschlag-auf-Kirche 
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constructing the us vs. them logic and in furthering the effectively Islamophobic 
rhetoric. Already at its beginning, the text is introduced with a statement that ‘Many 
Christians would not believe it’ (Viele Christen können es kaum fassen) which also 
adds sensationalism. Interestingly, what follows throughout the text are many 
nominal references to Austria which seem to be very explicitly ‘Christian’. Hence, we 
do not speak of Vienna where the act of vandalism took place but about its district 
‘Mariahilf’, and we also read that ‘the damages for the diocese could be enormous’ 
(Der Schaden für die Diözese dürfte enorm sein) with thereby the ‘Diocese’ 
appearing as the main recipient of the violent actions.  
 
Interestingly, in the central part of the text, an overt relationship to the Austrian right-
wing populist party FPÖ is also established by way of an (extensive) quote from H-C. 
Strache (FPÖ Party Leader) who allegedly commented on the issue in focus. While 
being quoted, Strache is claiming that if a Mosque was ever damaged in Austria, 
there would be a huge political outcry which, however, is not the case of the 
supposedly repeated acts of vandalism towards the Catholic/Christian Churches. 
What is thereby achieved here is not only the contrast Islam vs. Christianity but also 
the portrayal of Austrian main RWP as the ‘defender’ of Christian values and key 
articulator of anti-Muslim views (see also Krzyżanowski 2013a). Indeed, the overall 
cohesion is established in a rhetorical question which introduces Strache’s extensive 
comment: “A question may be asked, why did the Asylum-seeker not let out his hate 
in a Mosque?” (Da stellt sich die Frage, warum der Asylweber nicht auch in 
Moscheen wütete?).  
 
On the other hand, the Swedish post – published on Avpixlat on 28 November 2015 
(i.e. in the course of heated debates on Swedish then rapidly changing asylum policy; 
see Krzyżanowski 2018b) – is also introduced in a very similar (civil) way i.e. by 
means of visual framing representing Swedish public institutions (see Figure 3): on 
the one hand the police (represented by police line and also an image of a police car) 
as well as, on the other, the Swedish government immigration agency 
(Migrationsverket) represented by its widely-recognisable logo.  
 
However, already in the visual representation the conflation of police-related 
symbolism (providing connotations with safety, public order, etc. but also with 
emergency events via the presence of the police line) and of an immigration 
enforcement institution suggests that immigration in the news item should 
supposedly be perceived from the point of view of law-and-order or, as it eventually 
turns out, its violation. The effectively uncivil frame – relating immigration and 
asylum-seekers closely to crime and violence – is eventually developed further once 
we get to the actual text of the news item whose heading – rather extensive – reads 
“30 Men attempted to rape a woman in asylum centre, and kill her son – supposed 
punishment for breaking Sharia” (30 män hotade våldta kvinna och döda hennes son 
på asylboende – skulle straffas för brott mot sharia). It is already in the headline that 
all ‘standard’ elements of uncivil discourse about immigration are introduced 
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(similarly to the above Austrian item). We hence encounter references to the alleged: 
migrant criminality, violation of women’s rights, asylum-seeking (via reference to 
‘asylboende’) and, last but not least, to the Islam-related motivations behind the 
violence (via the reference to the ‘break of Sharia’ or brott mot sharia).   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Avpixlat Post of 28/11/20155 
 
The further parts of the Swedish post quite expectedly develop the outright 
Islamophobic ideas and views (in particular, by providing evidence to violence and 
disorder in asylum centres and relating it to religion of the immigrants). Here, the role 
of nominal references is central via establishment of links between, inter alia, “a large 
mob” (En stor mob), “30 male asylum seekers” (30 asylsökande män) “the orthodox 
Muslim men” (rättrogna muslimska männen), gradually implying that rape is 
connected to asylum seekers in general and to Muslim immigrants in particular (note 
the recontextualisation of ‘rape’ topos and ‘body politics’ arguments otherwise 
prevalent in anti-immigration discourses cf. Wodak 2015a). Importantly, the alleged 
Muslim/immigrant perpetrators are not, as has been the case before, nominalised, 
but are instead presented in a collectivised manner i.e. as a large and well organised 
violent male group. Hence, in the Swedish item we do not encounter anymore the 
																																																						
5 See: http://avpixlat.info/2015/11/28/30-man-hotade-valdta-kvinna-och-doda-hennes-son-pa-
asylboende-skulle-straffas-for-brott-mot-sharia 
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strategy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ representation (esp. Christian vs. Muslim, as in the Austrian 
case) but instead the whole focus of discursive representation is directed towards 
‘them’ (i.e. men, immigrants, asylum-seekers, Muslims, etc.).  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The two brief samples of online discourse above exemplify the strategic nature of 
using the ongoing civil-to-uncivil shifts in the uncivil society’s discursive 
representations of society and politics. These have, by now, become a widespread 
phenomenon as well as, in an equal way, part and parcel of (right-wing) populist 
politics in Europe and beyond. Spread and effectively ‘normalised’ by, in particular, 
the online uncivil society highlighted above, the anti-pluralist discourses favouring ‘us’ 
above ‘them’ have been propagated by populist – and esp. RWP – politics, yet have 
become socially-accommodated and accepted to large extent via the strategic 
discourse of uncivil society. The latter, under the guise of civil-like ‘objective opinions’ 
and ‘facts’, has been spreading exclusionary views and thus fuelling uncivil social 
and political visions resting on discrimination and rejection of diversity.  
 
An interesting aspect of the ‘borderline’ online uncivil society discourse we have 
showcased is in its largely conceptual and symbolic character (Krzyżanowski 2013b, 
2016, also Wodak 2015b). The latter boils down to using buzzwords/keywords 
symptomatic of certain opinions (esp. Islamophobia, see above) which are only (very) 
loosely related to occurrences and facts (which in and of themselves are also often 
dubious). As such, this serves sustaining ideologically-driven expression of 
antipluralist opinions and only uses reported events to put forward claims (often in 
favour of ‘us’, almost always against ‘them’) which are anyway at the core of populist 
and exclusionary agendas. It also changes the role of facts in current expressions of 
politics – and is essentially at the core of widespread ‘post-truth politics’ (see above). 
There, ideologies and emotions abide, norms of civility are constantly tested, and 
facts and reality are treated as, at best, secondary.     
 
Indeed, as we have highlighted, the uncivil populist discourses are either structurally 
(via the media platform organizations) or discursively (via overt/covert textual and 
visual references) closely related to Europe’s right-wing populist politics ideologies 
and, while pretending to represent bottom-up the wider society and citizenry, they 
effectively serve the top-down strategic interests of populist politics and politicians. 
This, as we have aimed to exemplify, is both the case in countries which have had a 
long-established history of right-wing populist parties (as is the case in Austria) but is 
also very relevant in other national contexts (such as Sweden) where parliamentary 
RWPs have come to the fore only recently. In all cases, however, voices and 
opinions of uncivil society have been central in sustaining the enduring presence and 
electoral success of RWPs and hence must be treated as one of the main sites 
where prototypical contemporary populist discourses of exclusion are constructed 
and disseminated.   
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